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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

(3)

4 February 1980

W. A. Barbee  
CW4, USA  
Chief, Declassification Branch  
Documents Division, Joint Secretariat  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Sir:

Your letter of 13 November 1979 requested that we review for declassification eight pages from one of the histories entitled The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954. These pages contain classified information extracted from, or attributed to, the CIA.

We have reviewed the eight pages and found that the CIA-attributed portions of those pages may be declassified. On the basis of this letter, you are authorized to declassify those references.

This memorandum is unclassified when removed from the enclosures.

Sincerely,

[redacted] 25X1A  
Chief, Classification Review Division  
Information Services Staff  
Directorate of Administration

Enclosures:

pp. 93, 94, 215, 216,  
263, 264, 265 & 266 [redacted]

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JCS review(s) completed.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 NOV 1979

13 November 1979

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[REDACTED]  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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[REDACTED]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing its program to review for declassification the histories of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to give them wider distribution.

Enclosed are reproductions of pages from one of the histories entitled The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954. These pages contain classified information extracted from, or attributed to, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Request your office review these pages to determine the current classification of the CIA information therein and advise this office of your action.

Please return the reproductions with your reply.

Upon removal of the enclosures, this memorandum becomes UNCLASSIFIED.

Sincerely,

*W.A. Barbee*  
W. A. BARBEE  
Chief, Declassification and  
Archival Branch  
Documents Division  
Joint Secretariat

Enclosures

pp. 93, 94, 215, 216,  
263, 264, 265, & 266.

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Council on 22 November 1954 with his own approval and that of the Service Secretaries.<sup>29</sup> In the Council, their viewpoint was opposed by Secretary of State Dulles, who believed that the United States should adjust to the trend of world opinion instead of seeking to reverse it, and should base its policy on recognition of the fact "that total war would be an incalculable disaster." Mr. Dulles did not dispute the need for adequate military strength or for a policy of determined resistance to aggression. Nevertheless, to retain the support of allies, the United States should forego actions that appeared "provocative," and, if hostilities occurred, should meet them in a manner that "will not inevitably broaden them into total nuclear war." Moreover, he was ready, under "proper conditions," to negotiate with the Communist nations concerning disarmament and other issues. Even if such negotiations yielded no agreement, they would at least expose the falsity of the Soviets' "peace" offensive.<sup>30</sup>

To the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), Secretary Dulles' views amounted to a rejection of paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2. The Committee believed that Secretary Dulles had overemphasized political at the expense of military considerations; had unrealistically assumed that use of nuclear weapons could be avoided in a general war; and had evidenced a premature readiness to negotiate.<sup>31</sup>

In criticizing the JSSC comments, General Ridgway made it clear that, to a large extent, he shared the outlook of the Secretary of State. He did not regard Mr. Dulles' views as inconsistent with NSC 162/2. Rather than foreswearing all attempts to negotiate, as the JSSC report appeared to suggest, General Ridgway would direct attention to insuring that the nation was militarily powerful enough to be able to negotiate

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29. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Review of Basic National Security Policy," 22 Nov 54, same file, sec 48.

30. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Review of Basic National Security Policy," 17 Nov 54, Encl to JCS 2101/172, 18 Nov 54, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 48.

31. (TS) JCS 2101/173, 21 Nov 54, same file.

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from strength.<sup>32</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, took no action on the Committee's report and made no official comment on the views of the Secretary of State.

The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, fully agreed with the Secretary's assessment. "There is throughout Europe," he warned the Council, "an impatience to explore the possibilities of 'coexistence' that will be increasingly difficult to resist." Although the United States might ignore this attitude for a time, a continuation of the Soviets' "peace offensive" could eventually force the nation to participate in the search for a general settlement if it did not wish to be diplomatically isolated. He offered no suggestions for coping with this difficulty, but did propose a coordinated economic, military, and covert counteroffensive against the Soviets' subversive warfare.<sup>33</sup>

The National Security Council took up the question of a revised national security policy on 24 November 1954. The members directed the Planning Board to prepare the draft of a new directive. They also considered, and referred to the President, a suggestion for a special study, to be made by governmental or private agencies, of ways in which, before the beginning of "mutual nuclear plenty," the unity of the free world might be increased and the Soviet bloc divided and weakened.<sup>34</sup>

While awaiting the draft, the Council discussed the subject inconclusively on 3 December and again on 9 December. At the first of these meetings, General Ridgway explained his dissenting views on national policy and strategy.<sup>35</sup> On the second occasion, the discussion turned to purely military matters.

32. (TS) Memo by CSA, "Review of Basic National Security Policy," 22 Nov 54, same file.

33. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Review of Basic National Security Policy," 18 Nov 54, same file.

34. (TS) NSC Action No. 1272, 24 Nov 54.

35. (TS) NSC Action No. 1279, 3 Dec 54.

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24 September 1952 the Board's chairman, Mr. Jack Gorrie, summarized the report for the National Security Council. The President thereupon directed the Department of Defense to survey the cost and feasibility of an early warning system.<sup>15</sup> Three weeks later, after hearing a report by the Department, President Truman instructed Mr. Gorrie and Secretary of Defense Lovett to prepare specific proposals for consideration along with the 1954 budget.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, the President and his advisors pursued several other lines of study of the air defense problem, beginning with the reexamination of national security programs undertaken in September 1952 by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security. In connection with this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a detailed description of existing continental defense forces and of the increases planned by the Services. They indicated various ways in which the forces could be further strengthened, at a cost of some \$10 billion above the \$7 billion cost of existing programs. They recommended that existing programs be completed as rapidly as possible, but that no new ones be approved without further study.<sup>17</sup>

The final report on security programs, which was sent to President Truman on 19 January 1953, went beyond the cautious conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It asserted flatly that present programs would not provide a "minimum acceptable continental defense," and that the nation should "consider favorably" the expenditure of "very substantial additional resources over the next few years" for the purpose.<sup>18</sup> The issue was one for the incoming Administration to resolve.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on this report before it was sent to the President, had pointed out that it

15. (TS) NSC Action No. 673, 24 Sep 52.

16. (TS) NSC Action No. 678, 14 Oct 52.

17. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Re-examination of programs for National Security," 20 Nov 52 (derived from JCS 2101/80), CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec 22.

18. (TS) NSC 141, 19 Jan 53, same file, BP pt 6.

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rated Soviet capabilities higher than they had when they made their recommendations. If the higher appraisal were to be accepted, they agreed, then additional continental defense measures would be needed, but these should not be allowed to jeopardize existing military programs.<sup>19</sup>

Accurate assessment of Soviet strength was vital to a decision on this grave issue. As early as August 1951, the National Security Council had instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, to prepare a "summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental United States." This study, completed in October 1952, concluded that the Soviet Union could inflict "serious but not permanently crippling damage." But the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith, characterized his report as a limited initial effort--one that "falls far short of supplying the estimates essential to security planning." He recommended that the Council authorize him to undertake a more detailed study and to submit proposals for establishment of an agency to produce such appraisals regularly in the future.<sup>20</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not question the value of such studies, but they believed that the Council's own staff should be responsible for preparing them. If that body could not do so, they told the Secretary of Defense, then they themselves should be assigned the task.<sup>21</sup>

19. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Re-examination of U.S. Programs for National Security," 12 Jan 53 (derived from JCS 2101/84), same file, sec 23.

20. (TS) NSC Action Nos. 519, 1 Aug 51, and 543, 30 Aug 51. (TS) Memo, Dir CIA to ExecSecy, NSC, "A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States," 14 Oct 52, App to JCS 1902/34, 28 Oct 52, CCS 371.2 US (3-30-48) sec 9.

21. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States," 21 Nov 52 (derived from JCS 1902/36), same file, sec 10.

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Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. This suggestion had come from the new Director, Mr. Allen Dulles.<sup>134</sup>

When the Committee submitted NSC 159 to the Council, President Eisenhower referred this part of it to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, for further study.<sup>135</sup> The outcome of this process was a set of proposals drafted by the Planning Board, based on recommendations from Dr. Flemming's office, that was sent to the Council on 9 April 1954. The Board concluded that continuing action in continental defense could be insured by requiring responsible agencies to submit semi-annual progress reports to the Council. For periodic reappraisal of Soviet capability, most Board members favored the establishment of a standing two-man subcommittee, to which other members would be added as necessary on an ad hoc basis, such as the heads of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission. But the JCS Advisor, supported by the Defense, Treasury, and FOA Members of the Board, believed the Department of Defense should be responsible for preparing such studies.<sup>136</sup>

The question at issue here had come up in October 1952 without being resolved. Soviet "net" capability was, of course, the difference between two other quantities, the Soviets' "gross" offensive capacity and the defensive strength of the United States. Who should perform the subtraction to derive this difference? One alternative would require highly classified information about US forces and weapons to be disclosed to persons outside the Department of Defense; the other would mean that equally sensitive intelligence information regarding the Soviet Union must be released outside

134. (TS) NSC 159, 22 Jul 53, JCS PB Adv File "NSC 159, 159/2 - Continental Defense." (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to PB, "Organization for Continental Defense," 19 Mar 54, same file, sec 38.

135. (TS) NSC Action No. 873, 6 Aug 53.

136. (S) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Organizational Arrangements for Continental Defense," 9 Apr 54, Encl to JCS 1899/110, 14 Apr 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec 39.

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the carefully guarded portals of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly supported the position taken by their advisor in the Board. The establishment of a special committee, they believed, would require detailed operating plans to be divulged to persons having no "need to know," and would infringe upon their own responsibilities and those of the National Security Council.<sup>137</sup>

Before the Council discussed the matter, Admiral Radford and Mr. Allen Dulles attempted to compose their differences in a conference that merely made it clear how far apart they were. The Director of Central Intelligence contended that responsibility for estimates of Soviet capabilities had been conferred upon him by law. No information would be needlessly endangered under his proposal, Mr. Dulles maintained; the subcommittee would require only estimates of the effectiveness of US forces, not details of war plans. Moreover, he feared that appraisals emanating from the Department of Defense might be "colored" for budgetary or other reasons. Admiral Radford viewed the process of evaluation as a conventional problem in military operational planning. In this view, the Central Intelligence Agency was analogous to the "intelligence section" of a commander's staff, and should feed data to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the equivalent of an "operations section") to be evaluated in relation to US capabilities. Admiral Radford also reminded Mr. Dulles that the Secretary of Defense had his own statutory responsibilities to consider.<sup>138</sup>

137. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Organizational Arrangements for Continental Defense," 23 Apr 54 (derived from JCS 1899/111), same file.

138. (TS) Memo for Record, 5 May 54 (unsigned; apparently prepared in office of GEN. Gerhart), recording conference between Radford and Dulles, same date; JCS PB Adv File, folder: NSC 5408 - Correspondence Regarding Through December 1955. The discussion ended inconclusively, with an agreement that ADM Radford would refer the matter back to JCS and SecDef and that a delay would be sought in discussion of the problem by NSC. Whether further discussion took place is unknown. At the request of the SecDef, however, the NSC on 6 May postponed consideration of the subject until its next meeting; (TS) NSC Action No. 1108, 6 May 54.

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After considering the subject on 13 May 1954, the National Security Council postponed a decision on the question of machinery for evaluation, while approving the Planning Board's other proposals.<sup>139</sup> On 9 June 1954 Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles appeared before the Council and set forth their opposing views. President Eisenhower then settled the issue through a compromise. He ordered the establishment, on a trial basis, of the subcommittee sought by Mr. Dulles, but named Admiral Radford as its chairman. The two members were to prepare their own terms of reference and were to be aided by a staff with a director of their own choosing. The President specified that there was to be no "unnecessary disclosure" of war plans or of intelligence methods or sources.<sup>140</sup>

In accord with this decision, Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles submitted terms of reference, modeled on those given the Edwards Subcommittee in 1953, which called for a report covering the period through 1 July 1957 to be submitted by 1 November 1954. The council approved these terms on 24 June.<sup>141</sup>

On 4 November 1954 Admiral Radford and Mr. Dulles submitted their findings to the Council. The members of that body found no reason to order any change in continental defense programs, but approved the subcommittee's recommendation that a permanent procedure be established to insure a new evaluation at least annually. The nature of this procedure was left for future determination.<sup>142</sup>

#### The Northern Canada (Distant Early Warning) Line

The Arctic test program was conducted by the Western Electric Company under a contract with the Air Research and Development Command of the US Air Force. By the middle of 1954 the results showed that it was feasible to operate radar

- 139. (TS) NSC Action No. 1113, 13 May 54.

140. (TS) NSC Action No. 1150, 9 Jun 54.

141. (TS) NSC 5423, 23 Jun 54, CCS 381 US (5-23-46)

sec 42. (TS) NSC Action No. 1164, 24 Jun 54.

142. (TS) NSC Action No. 1260, 4 Nov 54. No copy of the Subcommittee's report has been found.

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warning stations at high latitudes. Engineers of the company, in consultation with US and Canadian Air Force and Navy officers, had selected tentative sites for a line all the way across Canada.<sup>143</sup>

On the basis of these findings, the US-Canadian Military Study Group on 3 June 1954 recommended the construction of an early line across the "more northern portions of North America," in order to keep defenses abreast of expected Soviet technological progress. The members pointed out that the value of this line would be "directly related to the effectiveness with which it is extended to cover flanking approach routes," thus in effect recommending that, like the Mid-Canada Line, it should be thrust out into the oceans.<sup>144</sup> On 9 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the US members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to seek the agreement of their Canadian colleagues to the construction of the line.<sup>145</sup>

Meanwhile, on 30 June 1954, the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes, had notified Admiral Radford that the Canadian Government would construct the Mid-Canada Line at its own expense. Admiral Radford, in reply, promised that the United States would erect the seaward extensions "progressively," and told General Foulkes that the question of the far northern line would soon be raised within the Permanent Joint Board.<sup>146</sup>

In acknowledging this reply, General Foulkes wrote that his Government was already convinced of the need for the northern line, and hence that no Board action was needed. At the same time, he pointed out that, under current plans, all radar lines in eastern Canada--the PINE TREE chain, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Atlantic extension of the latter--would converge on the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland,

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143. (TS-RD) DOD Progress Rpt, 1 Jun 54, p. 17.

144. (S) JCS 1899/125, 29 Jun 54, CCS 413.44 (7-1-48)  
sec 8.

~145. (S) Dec On JCS 1899/125, 9 Jul 54; (S) SM-630-54  
to Chm, US Sec, PJBD, 9 Jul 54; same file.

146. (TS) Ltr, Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, to CJCS,  
30 Jun 54, and reply, 8 Jul 54, Encls B and C to JCS 1899/134,  
21 Jul 54, same file.

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